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ADMINISTRATIVE MONOPOLY AND CHINA’S 
NEW ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: LESSONS FROM 
EUROPE’S STATE AID DOCTRINE 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 1, 2008, China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), its first 
comprehensive anti-monopoly legislation, came into effect.
1
 Observers 
guardedly hope the AML will serve as a crucial legal foundation for the 
sustained development of China’s thriving market economy.
2
 Much as 
American antitrust law is ―the Magna Carta of [United States] free 
enterprise‖
3
 and European Community competition law helped provide the 
economic basis for the ongoing political unification of Europe,
4
 the AML 
may similarly cement the role of the free market in post-reform China.
5
  
One of the most exciting parts of the AML is Chapter V, ―Abuse of 
Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition.‖
6
 This chapter 
is aimed at preventing government agencies and organs from using their 
power to interfere in competition, particularly regarding interprovincial 
and interregional business.
7
 Economists typically call such government 
 
 
 1. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Longduan Fa [Anti-Monopoly Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), translated in 
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 11, 2010) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter AML], available at http://www.law 
infochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=6351&keyword=.  
 2. See, e.g., Salil K. Mehra & Meng Yanbei, Against Antitrust Functionalism: Reconsidering 
China’s Antimonopoly Law, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 379, 383 (2008).  
 3. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
 4. See Michael Burgess, Introduction: Federalism and Building the European Union, 26 
PUBLICS 1, 1–3 (1996).  
 5. Guo Xiaoyu, Jingji Xianfa, Jian zhi Longduan Xingwei [The Economic Constitution, A Sword 
Pointed at Monopoly Behavior], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Aug. 26, 2007, available at 
http://www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?cid=13&id=2094. 
 6. See AML, supra note 1, ch. V. 
 7. Portions of Chapter V of the AML are excerpted below:  
 Article 32: No administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may abuse its administrative power to 
force or use a disguised form to force any entities or individuals to deal, purchase, or use the 
commodities provided by the business operators designated by such an administrative organ 
or organization. 
 Article 33: No administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or 
administrative regulation to administer public affairs may abuse its administrative power to 
block the inter-region free trading of commodity by taking the following measures: 
 1. Setting discriminatory charges, implementing discriminatory charge rates, or fixing 
discriminatory prices for non-local commodities; 
 2. Imposing technical requirements or inspection standards on non-local commodities 
that are different from those on their local counterparts, or taking discriminatory technical 












interference an ―administrative monopoly.‖
8
 Given China’s history of state 
presence in nearly every facet of the economy,
9
 Chapter V of the AML has 
the potential to bring monumental changes to the nature of the Chinese 
economy and even political system. Yet as with any fundamental 
economic transformation, the way ahead is unclear. China’s judicial 
system is improving, but is still inexperienced in competition law,
10
 and 
drawing a definitive line between proper state economic intervention and 
illegal state interference is inherently difficult.  
This Note will look to the European Community doctrine of State Aid
11
 
to suggest a path for implementation of the AML’s administrative 
monopoly provisions. Some of the suggestions are very unlikely to be 
implemented given China’s current economic and political situation,
12
 but 
are offered for consideration of China’s long-term legal and economic 
development. Part I will discuss economic and political consequences of 
administrative monopolies, followed by a focus on administrative 
monopolies in China specifically. Part II then addresses the history and 
 
 
measures, such as repeated inspections or repeated certifications on non-local commodities, 
so as to restrict the entry of non-local commodities into the local market; 
 3. Adopting the administrative licensing aimed at non-local commodities, so as to restrict 
the entry of non-local commodities into the local market;  
 4. Setting up barriers or adopting any other means to block either the entry of non-local 
commodities or the exit of local commodities; or 
 5. Other activities that may block the inter-region free trading of commodity. 
[Articles 34 & 35 prohibit local protectionism.] 
[Articles 36 & 37 omitted.] 
See id. 
 8. See Yong Guo & Angang Hu, The Administrative Monopoly in China’s Economic 
Transition, 37 COMMUNIST AND POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 265 (2004). Although the term would seem 
to indicate an actual monopoly, the term ―administrative monopoly‖ is much broader and includes 
most rent-seeking behavior by the government. Rent seeking may be defined as ―activities using scarce 
resources to capture an artificially created transfer from the political process, which is in excess of 
those a competitive marketplace would allow, but less than the damage that it brings to the others.‖ Id. 
at 268 (citing GORDEN TULLOCK, RENT SEEKING (1999)). 
 9. See Rupert N. W. Hodder, China’s Industry—Horizontal Linkages in Shanghai, 15 
TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 487, 487–89 (1990). 
 10. Bruce Owen et al., summarize some of the major problems with China’s judiciary:  
Until recently, a large portion of Chinese judges were selected from retired military officers. 
Those judges generally have no formal legal training or experience, and are ill-equipped to 
handle complicated cases. Although the overall quality of Chinese judges has improved in 
recent years, it remains doubtful whether Chinese judges—most of whom are not trained in 
economics or experienced in business—will be competent to handle antitrust cases brought 
under the AML.  
Bruce M. Owen et al., China’s Competition Policy Reforms: The Anti-monopoly Law and Beyond, 75 
ANTITRUST L.J. 231, 242 (2008). 
 11. See infra notes 111–20 and accompanying text. 













political context of competition law in China, followed by a history and 
outline of China’s new AML. Part III is a history and outline of European 
competition law and its enforcement, with a focus on Europe’s State Aid 
doctrine.
13
 Part IV compares the situations of Europe and China and 
ultimately suggests areas where European competition law could instruct 
implementation of the AML and its enforcement mechanisms.  
I. ADMINISTRATIVE MONOPOLIES 
A. The Problem of Administrative Monopolies Generally 
Possibly without exception, every country with a functioning 
government has administrative monopolies,
14
 ranging from local trash 
pickup to a national electric grid. The problem of administrative 
monopolies (―abuse of administrative power,‖ to use the language of the 
AML
15
) arises when government uses its power to control markets through 
legislation, regulations, or use of administrative organs to seek above-
market rents.
16
 Economic theory generally holds that administrative 
monopolies, like other monopolies, hamper overall social welfare with 
increased prices, reduced output, and reduced competition.
17
 In addition, 
administrative monopolies are often geographically protectionist, 
disrupting trade and potentially weakening the political unity of the 
broader unit (the nation, in the case of China or the United States, or the 
European Union in Europe’s case).
18
  
B. The Origin and Problem of Administrative Monopolies in China 
Administrative monopolies are associated with a number of problems, 
explained below. Aside from the economic deficiencies associated with 
 
 
 13. See infra notes 111–20 and accompanying text. 
 14. ―Administrative monopoly,‖ for the purposes of this Note, can be loosely defined as a 
monopoly the economic power of which is maintained at least in part by official administrative or 
regulatory power. For a discussion of the definition of administrative monopoly, see MARK WILLIAMS, 
COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW IN CHINA, HONG KONG AND TAIWAN 158 (Cambridge Univ. Press) 
(2005). 
 15. See AML, supra note 1, ch. V. 
 16. See supra note 14. 
 17. See Yong Guo & Angang Hu, supra note 8, at 275–78. Competition, in turn, is generally 
considered economically beneficial because it (1) tends to allocate resources according to consumer 
preference, (2) encourages producers to meet the dynamic preferences of consumers, and (3) keeps 
sellers’ prices down by the constant threat of consumers switching to other, lower cost sellers. D. G. 
GOYDER, EEC COMPETITION LAW 8–9 (1988). 
 18. Yong Guo & Angang Hu, supra note 8, at 275–78. 












monopolies generally, the localized and political nature of such entities 
tends to undermine the regulatory process, and also tends to create 
problematic regulations, such as trade restrictions, because single entities 
are vested with the conflicting goals of market participation and regulatory 
power.
19
 This mish-mash of market participation and regulatory 
responsibility is a result of China’s rapid transition from a command 




China’s post-1978 economic reforms resulted in a great deal of 
decentralization.
21
 In the pre-1978 Maoist era, the economy was nearly 
entirely state-planned.
22
 By its nature, a centrally planned economy is a 
market heavy with state-owned enterprises (SOEs), many of which are 
administrative monopolies.
23
 Thus, China has had administrative 
monopolies not only in the traditional sectors such as utilities, 
transportation, and telecommunications,
24
 but also in sectors where the 
role of government is traditionally far more circumscribed in free-market 
economies, including entertainment and tourism.
25
 After coming to power 
in 1978, Deng Xiaoping
26
 radically altered China’s economic system to 
focus on growth through marketization and free enterprise instead of state 
control.
27
 Concurrently with these free market reforms, Beijing devolved 
 
 
 19. Id. at 270. 
 20. Barry Naughton, Deng Xiaoping: The Economist, 135 CHINA Q. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 491, 492 
(1993). 
 21. See YONGNIAN ZHENG, DE FACTO FEDERALISM IN CHINA: REFORMS AND DYNAMICS OF 
CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS, vii (2007). 
 22. See Hodder, supra note 9, at 487–89. 
 23. See supra note 19.  
 24. See Saibal Dasgupta, China Launches First-Ever Private Railways, TIMES OF INDIA, Oct. 4, 
2009, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/China-launches-first-ever-private-
railways/articleshow/5087076.cms; Jing Yang, China’s Wind Farms Come With a Catch: Coal Plants, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2009, at A17, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1254097307 
11245037.html. Such industries are often ―natural monopolies‖; Market Avenue, Cracking the 
Monopoly in China’s Telecommunication Industry, http://www.marketavenue.cn/upload/articles/ 
ARTICLES_1438.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2009); see PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 
23 (6th ed. 2004). 
 25. See Yong Guo & Angang Hu, supra note 8, at 274. 
 26. Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 signaled the end of China’s most radical period of ideological 
governance and significant upheaval, the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. Following Mao’s 
death, China entered a period of relative calm and political uncertainty. Deng Xiaoping, then First 
Vice-premier of the State Council, politically outmaneuvered other Communist Party leaders to wrest 
power from Mao’s appointed successor, Hua Guofeng in late 1978. At the Third Plenum of the Central 
Committee in December 1978, Deng Xiaoping announced the Four Modernizations, generally 
considered the beginning of China’s Reform and Opening Up (gaige kaifang). Naughton, supra note 
20, at 499–501. 













control of much of the economy to local and provincial governments.
28
 
Local and provincial governments’ incomes shifted from disbursements 




The economic reforms have been wildly successful in bringing 
hundreds of millions out of poverty,
30
 but local control and financing has 
created opportunities for the creation and abuse of administrative 
monopolies and incentives for local protectionism.
31
 One example of local 
protectionism includes charging higher fees in Shanghai for cars produced 
outside the city.
32
 Additionally, local control of income sources weakens 
Beijing’s regulatory measures, as local governments often fund their own 
judges and other regulatory bodies;
33
 and where regulatory power still 
rests with Beijing, local officials would often rather take the mild risk of 
punishment from Beijing than forego income derived from local SOEs.
34
 
Other forms of Chinese administrative monopolies include industrial trade 
barriers and administrative companies.
35
 Examples of industrial trade 
barriers include government departments responsible for a certain industry 
or trade associations using their regulatory power to block new entrants.
36
 
This is essentially a form of regulatory capture that creates an 
administrative monopoly.
37
 China also has a number of ―administrative 
companies,‖ which are companies that have both the power to regulate an 
industry and engage in that industry itself.
38
 Existence of such 
administrative companies is a result of government reform failing to keep 
pace with China’s broader reforms.
39
 Likely consequences of such a 
 
 
 28. C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 76–77 (2008). 
 29. Id. at 76 (citing ZHENG YONGNIAN, DE FACTO FEDERALISM IN CHINA: REFORMS AND 
DYNAMICS OF CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS (2007)). 
 30. See World Bank, PovcalNet, http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2010); see also World Bank, Overview: Understanding, Measuring and Overcoming 
Poverty, http://go.worldbank.org/RQBDCTUXW0 (last visited Nov. 4, 2009). 
 31.  See Yong Guo & Angang Hu, supra note 8, at 273. 
 32. R. Hewitt Pate, What I Heard in the Great Hall of the People—Realistic Expectations of 
Chinese Antitrust, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 203 (2008). 
 33. Id. 
 34. BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 28, at 77 (citing Gong Ting, Corruption and Local 
Governance: The Double Identity of Chinese Local Governments in Market Reform, 19 PAC. REV. 85 
(2006), and Hehui Jin et al., Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese 
Style (Stanford Univ., Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 99013, 1999)).  
 35. CHAOWU JIN & WEI LUO, COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA 97–98 (2002).  
 36. See id. 
 37. See source cited infra note 140. 
 38. See generally Bing Song, Competition Policy in a Transitional Economy: The Case of China, 
31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 387, 406–08 (1995). 
 39. See CHAOWU JIN & WEI LUO, supra note 35, at 97–98; see also Chenxia Shi & Dong Kaijun, 












combination of market participation and regulatory power are some of the 
problems associated with regulatory capture
40
—an administrative 
company will have the conflicting goals of earning profits in the market 
and regulating the market for the benefit of consumers, the economy, and 
the state as a whole. The AML’s administrative monopoly provisions are 
an attempt to reassert central control,
41
 tear down barriers to economic 
growth, protect consumers, and regulate competition.
42
 They are also a 
necessary part of the AML’s general goal of establishing a comprehensive 
competition law to replace China’s former piecemeal competition regime. 
II. COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA AND THE AML 
A. History of China’s Competition Legislation and the AML 
Before beginning the outline of the AML, it is worth noting one 
commentator’s perspective on the primary purpose of China’s AML in 
contrast to competition laws in other countries: 
[E]xcessive [government] intervention still widely exists all over 
the country and is by far the top threat to competition. The primary 
mission of the AML is to correct governmental distortion rather 
than limit private restrictive practices. That also explains why it 
contains a special chapter addressing ―administrative monopoly‖ or 
State restraint on trade. 
 Therefore, one has to bear in mind that the AML is not merely 
designed to restore competition but also to take affirmative actions 
to ―create‖ competition. This unique feature distinguishes it from 
competition laws in most other jurisdictions.
43
 
The AML promises to significantly improve a competition law regime 
hindered by a history of piecemeal and often unenforced legislation, as 
 
 
The Proposed Antitrust Law and the Problem of Administrative Monopolies in China, 12 TRADE 
PRACS. L.J. 106, 109 (2004). 
 40. See infra note 140. 
 41. The AML may also be viewed as part of a broader push to reassert central control of China 
generally and as a means of improving perceptions of local regulatory enforcement and provision of 
social services. See BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 28, at 77.  
 42. As discussed elsewhere in the article, the actual makeup and degree of independence of the 
AML’s so-called ―anti-monopoly authority‖ is far from clear at this stage. See Yujia Wang, Fan 
Xingzheng Longduan Nengfou Pobing [Could the Anti-Administrative Monopoly Measures be a 
Breakthrough?], XIN CAIJING, Sept. 2008 at 98–99.  
 43. Yong Huang, Pursuing the Second Best: The History, Momentum, and Remaining Issues of 













well as overlapping and unclear enforcement agencies.
44
 The 1993 Anti-
Unfair Competition Law
45
 was the most important early effort at a 







 as well as a small provision prohibiting government abuse of 
administrative power.
49
 Other competition provisions can be found in laws 
such as the Commercial Banking Law,
50
 the Price Law,
51
 the Procurement 
and Bidding Law,
52
 and the Patent Law,
53
 and a variety of administrative 
 
 
 44. Chenxia Shi and Dong Kaijun cite three main reasons for ineffective regulation of 
monopolies and competition: 
 1. The Lack of uniformity. Scattered provisions on monopolies give only limited support 
to the authority of the legal provisions. 
 2. A lack of concrete enforcement measures against monopolistic practices. The Anti-
Unfair Competition Law has only a few articles dealing with monopolistic acts. They are 
generally in broad terms and no specific enforcement measures are set down in the Law. 
 3. A weak enforcement authority. The State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
(SAIC) above the county level is currently the enforcement authority of unfair competition 
law and antimonopoly regulations. The SAIC’s enforcement system is essentially an internal 
mechanism within the state administration system, and, in the exercise of enforcement 
functions, it relies on the cooperation of government departments and local governments. The 
competence of SAIC and the resources available to it to enforce the law have therefore been 
constantly challenged.  
Chenxia Shi & Dong Kaijun, supra note 39, at 108 (citations omitted). 
 45. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Bu Zhengdang Jingji Fa [Anti-Unfair Competition Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 
1993), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 11, 2010) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Anti-Unfair 
Competition Law], available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=648& 
keyword=. The primary enforcement bodies of for the Anti-Unfair Competition Law are the AICs. Id. 
 46. See Anti-Unfair Competition Law, supra note 45, art. 12.  
 47. See id. art. 11. 
 48. See id. art. 15. 
 49. See id. art. 12.  
 50. See Article 9 of Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa [Law of Commercial 
Banking] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., May 10, 1995, effective 
July 1, 1995), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 11, 2010) (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=456&keyword=. 
 51. See Article 14 of Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangye Yinhang Fa [Price Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1997, effective May 1, 
1998), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 11, 2010) (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=76&keyword=. The Price Law covers price 
competition, pricing behavior, predatory pricing, and price discrimination. Id. 
 52. See Article 32 of Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Zhaobiao Toubiao Fa [Procurement and 
Bidding Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 1999, 
effective Jan. 1, 2000), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 11, 2010) (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=1014&keyword=. The Procurement and 
Bidding Law covers collusive bidding and transparency in the bidding process. Id. 
 53. See Article 48 of Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa (2008 xiuzheng) [Patent Law] 
(adopted by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985), 
translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 11, 2010) (P.R.C.), available at http://www. 
lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=38&keyword=.  
















In light of the fragmented and vague laws and regulations listed above, 
the Chinese government has had its sights on a comprehensive 
competition law since as early as 1987.
55
 In 1994, the State Economic and 
Trade Commission (SETC)
56
 and State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC)
57
 began work on the AML.
58
 After the project sat on 
the backburner for years, the National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee announced its revitalization ―[a]fter China’s accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002,‖ and a number of drafts were 
circulated between 2002 and 2004.
59
 Despite the concerns of foreign 
onlookers regarding the AML’s hurdles for mergers involving foreign 
businesses acquiring Chinese companies, the issue of administrative 
monopolies was the most contested within China.
60
 As a result of the 
variety of interests and viewpoints involved, the final version was 





 54. Bruce Owen et al., supra note 10, at 233–35.  
 55. Chenxia Shi & Dong Kaijun, supra note 39, at 107.  
 56. SETC became the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in 2003. See Owen et al., supra note 
10, at 236.  
 57. The SAIC, an administrative body directly under China’s State Council has duties: 
 1. To crackdown [sic] on speculation, if the circumstances of a speculation case are so 
serious as to be punishable according to the criminal code, such a case should be referred to 
the prosecuting organ; 
 2. To administrate sales contracts, contracts for placing orders for processing materials 
. . . mediating and arbitrating disputes, for the management of purchasing and marketing 
personnel from other places;  
 3. To manage marketplace transactions in order to protect fair trading and clamp down 
black market activities; 
 4. To administer the registration of industrial and commercial enterprises, inspect and 
deter activities that violate the policies and regulatory provisions of the state, and crackdown 
[sic] unlicensed business operations; and 
 5. To administer trademarks.  
CHAOWU JIN & WEI LUO, supra note 35, at 174 (footnotes omitted). According to Jin and Luo, as of 
2002, ―AICs [administrations of industry and commerce—the branches of the SAIC below the national 
level] serve as the major organs in enforcing competition law, while other state organs serve as 
auxiliaries.‖ Id. at 175. 
 58. See Yong Huang, supra note 43, at 118–19. 
 59. Id. at 119; Pate, supra note 32, at 197–98.  
 60. See Eleanor M. Fox, An Anti-Monopoly Law for China- Scaling the Walls of Government 
Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 173, 175 (2008) (―Earlier drafts of the AML included tougher controls 
on administrative monopoly. These were controversial and were ultimately weakened in a compromise 
. . . .‖); H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Kathy Lijun Yang, China: Latest Developments in Anti-Monopoly 
Law Legislation, ANTITRUST, Spring 2005, at 90. 
 61. Chinese legislators and scholars debated whether China even needed a competition law, as 













B. Political Context of the AML’s Passage 
The AML has been in the works for well over a decade.
62
 Its concrete 
emergence over the past two years, however, is not only a reflection of the 
central government policies outlined above and their tension with local 
interests, but is also the product of an ongoing debate within the central 
government.
63
 This debate arose within China’s top political circles over 
the direction of China’s economy following the export-led boom of the 
1990s and early 2000s.
64
 It broadly pits a ―liberal‖ or ―reformist‖ camp 
stressing free markets and rapid economic development against ―new left‖ 
critics of neoclassical economics and weakening social services.
65
 
Compounding the debate is the variety of interests engaged in China’s 
policy debates.
66
 These interests had a significant impact on the final draft 
of the AML.
67
 It is possible that part of the reason the administrative 
monopoly provisions were so contentious is the political power and 
opposition of the giant central government monopolies—particularly the 
national railroad, petrochemicals, and telecommunications.
68
 It would be 
unfair, however, to portray the AML as purely the product of political 
struggle between subsets of the Communist Party leadership, different 
branches of government, and special interests. To no small degree, the 
AML’s drafters sought input from domestic legal experts and foreign legal 
scholars.
69
 The result is a law that, despite its significant flaws, is a step 
forward in the development of China’s legal regime. 
 
 
multinationals. See Yong Huang, supra note 43, at 118. 
 62. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 63. See BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 28, at 33.  
 64. See id. at 33–40. 
 65. For an in-depth discussion of China’s policy debates, see generally id. See also Kelvin Chi-
kin Cheung, Modernity, History, and the Negotiation of Chinese Identity: Revisiting the Liberals/New 
Left Debate, in CHINA IN SEARCH OF A HARMONIOUS SOCIETY (Sujian Guo & Baogang Guo eds., 
2008). According to Cheung, ―the Liberals argue for further political and economic reform to weaken 
the link between the state and market.‖ Id. at 171. The Liberals believe that many of China’s social 
ills, including widening inequality and rampant corruption, are a result of economic reform outpacing 
political reform. Id. The ―New Left,‖ on the other hand, believe market liberalization is the root of 
China’s current social and governance problems, and should be rolled back, particularly the rapid 
privatization of SOEs. Id.  
 66. See infra note 67. 
 67. See Hongqing Duan & Qian Hu, New Antitrust Law Spares Government Monopolies, 
CAIJING, Sept. 3, 2007, available at http://english.caijing.com.cn/2007-09-03/100028916.html. 
 68. The strenuous assertions that the AML does not apply to such monopolies by commentators 
and drafters can be seen as reassurances to those parties that their interests will be protected. See Yujia 
Wang, supra note 42, at 98; see also Cuiqin Wang, Difang Xingzhengxing Dui Shichang Longduan de 
Chengyin Zhili [Contributing Factors and Governance For Local Administrative Market Monopolies], 
MODERN ECONOMIC RESEARCH (Chinese: XIANDAI JINGJI TANTAO) 7th issue 2008, at 79.  
 69. See infra note 172. See also Xiaoye Wang, Highlights of China’s New Anti-Monopoly Law, 












C. Outline of the Monopoly Law and Its Administrative Monopoly 
Provisions 
The AML is composed of eight chapters, most of which are beyond the 
scope of this Note.
70
 This Note is primarily concerned with Chapter V, 
―Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition,‖ 
and other articles of the law dealing with enforcement and exceptions.
71
 It 
should also be noted that the AML is only a broad, initial outline law.
72
 
Implementing regulations are expected, but thus far few have been 
formally promulgated.
73
 It is expected that many of the more controversial 
issues have been left for the implementing regulations.
74
  
Chapter V begins with a series of negative duties, starting with Article 
32, which prohibits government agencies and organs from granting 
monopolies.
75
 Article 33 prohibits protectionism and unequal treatment of 
local and outside goods.
76
 Article 34 prohibits protectionist bidding 
procedures.
77
 Article 35 prohibits unequal treatment of outside 
businesses.
78
 Article 36 prohibits government agencies from forcing 
businesses to engage in ―monopolistic activities.‖
79
 Article 37 is a catch-all 






75 ANTITRUST L.J. 133, 134 (2008) (―The competition enforcement agencies of other countries, in 
particular the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, and the European 
Commission contributed significant assistance.‖). 
 70. See AML, supra note 1. Chapter I contains ―General provisions,‖ Chapter II covers 
―Monopoly Agreements,‖ Chapter III covers ―Abuse of Dominant Market Position,‖ Chapter IV 
covers ―Concentration of Business Operators,‖ Chapter V covers ―Abuse of Administrative Power to 
Eliminate or Restrict Competition,‖ Chapter VI covers ―Investigation into Suspicious Monopolistic 
Conduct,‖ Chapter VII covers ―Legal Liabilities,‖ and Chapter VIII contains ―Supplementary 
Provisions.‖ Id. 
 71. See AML, supra note 1. 
 72. See Yong Huang, supra note 43, at 125–28. 
 73. At the time of this writing, only the draft regulations covering thresholds for mergers and 
acquisitions, and draft regulations for procedures from MOFCOM, the NDRC, and SAIC have been 
released.  
 74. Yong Huang, supra note 43, at 127. 
 75. See AML, supra note 1, art. 32. 
 76. See id. art. 33. 
 77. See id. art. 34. 
 78. See id. art. 35. 
 79. See id. art. 36. Monopolistic conduct is broadly defined in Article 3 of the AML. See id. art. 
3. 













The AML also includes provisions creating two enforcement 
authorities: the Anti-monopoly Commission,
81
 and the Anti-monopoly 
Law Enforcement Agency.
82
 This appears to be a two-tiered system, 
whereby the Anti-monopoly Commission creates general competition 
policy and coordinates enforcement, and the Anti-monopoly Law 
Enforcement Agency carries out specific enforcement matters.
83
 The Anti-
monopoly Commission was created shortly before the enactment of the 
AML as an independent body under the State Council.
84
 The identity of 
the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Agency, however, is unclear. The 
AML does not indicate whether the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement 
Agency will be an independent body under the State Council;
85
 or part of 





 and the SAIC. The notice creating the 
Anti-monopoly Commission
88
 suggests that the Anti-monopoly Law 
 
 
 81.  
The State Council shall establish an Anti-monopoly Commission, which is responsible for 
organizing, coordinating and guiding the anti-monopoly work and performs the following 
functions: 
 1. Studying and drafting relevant competition policies; 
 2. Organizing the investigation and assessment of overall competition situations, and 
releasing an assessment report; 
 3. Formulating and releasing anti-monopoly guidelines; 
 4. Coordinating the anti-monopoly administrative law enforcement; and 
 5. Other functions assigned by the State Council. 
 The composition and working rules of the Anti-monopoly Committee shall be established 
by the State Council.  
See AML, supra note 1, art. 9. The Chinese word ―weiyuanhui‖ can be translated as either 
Commission or Committee. 
 82. See id. art. 10. The Chinese word ―jigou‖ can be translated as either Agency or Authority. 
 83. Mehra & Meng Yanbei, supra note 2, at 406–07.  
 84. Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu guowuyuan fan longduan weiyuanhui zhuti zhize he 
zucheng renyuan de tongzhi [Notice of the General Office of the State Council on the Main Functions 
and Members of the Anti-monopoly Commission of the State Council] (promulgated by the State 
Council, July 28, 2008, effective July 28, 2008), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 11, 
2010) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Notice], available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db= 
1&id=7190&keyword=.  
 85. The ―Guówùyuàn.‖ See XIN ZHANG, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WTO AGREEMENTS IN CHINA 
24 (2005). This is China’s top administrative authority. Id. The State Council is subordinate to the 
National People’s Congress (Quanguo Renmin Daobiao Dahui), which is the legislative organ and 
officially the most powerful organ of government. Id. This structure is replicated at the provincial, 
municipal, county, and town levels. Id. at 25. In theory, these lower-level organs are completely 
subordinate to their central government counterparts, but in practice the local level governments often 
ignore the central government. Id. at 26.  
 86. The Ministry of Commerce (Shangwu Bu). See supra note 56. 
 87. The National Development and Reform Commission. See Yong Huang, supra note 43, at 
125–26. 
 88. See Notice, supra note 84. 












Enforcement Agency will be part of MOFCOM, but the language is 
somewhat vague.
89
 Thus far, it seems that enforcement authority has 
remained with the three agencies above, with the power to enforce AML 
provisions regarding administrative monopoly in the hands of the SAIC.  
Article 51 is the primary enforcement provision for Chapter V. Instead 
of directly granting either of the to-be-established enforcement authorities 
the power to punish government organs for violating the AML, this power 
and the authority to remedy their behavior rests with those organs’ 
superior agencies in the government.
90
 The Anti-monopoly Law 
Enforcement Agency may only make suggestions for enforcement to the 
superior agencies of a possible administrative violator of the AML.
91
 
Article 51 also provides that in the event of a conflict between the AML 
and other laws or regulations governing the government organ, the other 
regulations prevail.
92
 This potentially limits the effectiveness of the AML, 
as special regulations could be implemented to evade a prohibition in the 
AML. 
Article 7 is perhaps the most powerful exclusion in the AML. It 
provides in part: 
With respect to the industries controlled by the State-owned 
economy and concerning the lifeline of national economy and 
national security or the industries lawfully enjoying exclusive 
production and sales, the State shall protect these lawful business 
operations conducted by the business operators therein, and shall 
supervise and control these business operations and the prices of 
these commodities and services provided by these business 






 89. ―The Ministry of Commerce shall undertake the specific work of the Anti-monopoly 
Commission . . . .‖ See Notice, supra note 84. 
 90. See AML, supra note 1, art. 51. 
 91. See id. 
 92. I translate the relevant part of Article 51 to read: ―Where there are other laws or 
administrative regulations dealing with abuse of administrative power and behavior eliminating or 
restricting competition by administrative organs or organizations empowered to manage public affairs, 
such other laws shall govern.‖ This provision not only gives veto power to other laws that prohibit 
anticompetitive behavior, but to any law that expressly allows anticompetitive behavior. Id. 
 93. See AML, supra note 1, art. 7. This exception is extremely powerful in shielding many of 
China’s SOEs.  
Eighty percent of the assets controlled by SOEs in 2006 were concentrated in eight ―strategic 
sectors,‖ such as petroleum and electricity generation. SOEs accounted for almost all of the 













A possible effect of this article is to exclude any state-owned entity that 
can be plausibly considered to be operating in a very important economic 
sector as long as its exclusion could conceivably protect consumers or aid 
technological development. Such an exclusion, if interpreted broadly, 
would be sweeping and would leave a gaping hole in the effectiveness of 
the AML.  
D. Assessment of the AML and Issues in Enforcing Its Administrative 
Monopoly Provisions 
The provisions prohibiting abusive behavior by government organs are 
not detailed and will need clarification either through further regulations or 
interpretation by the to-be-created anti-monopoly authorities. As a 
possible means for future interpretation of the AML, I look to European 
Community competition law for guidance in areas with which China’s 
anti-monopoly law will surely grapple in the coming years, particularly 
Europe’s rules dividing the state and private sectors.  
First, commentators generally encourage the creation of a transparent 
and independent anti-monopoly authority.
94
 Currently, it appears the large 
agencies with authority over competition—including SAIC, MOFCOM, 
and the National Development & Reform Commission (NDRC)—are 
sharing responsibility for enforcing the provisions of the AML.
95
 Their 
power structures create a web spread throughout numerous regulatory 
bodies and government agencies, creating a high likelihood for conflicts of 
interest.
96
 For example, MOFCOM is charged with promoting foreign 
direct investment (FDI),
97
 a goal that could conflict with the AML’s 
review of anticompetitive conduct.
98
 This division of power creates a 
 
 
telecommunication services, generated approximately 55 percent of electricity, and flew 
about 82 percent of passengers and cargo through the country’s air transportation system. 
Owen et al., supra note 10, at 243–44 (citing Liao Wang, Breaking Up Monopolies Key to the 
Restructuring of SOEs, LIAOWANG, Dec. 13, 2006, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/ 
2006-12/13/content_5480196.htm). 
 94. See, e.g., Yong Huang, supra note 43, at 125. But see Mehra & Meng Yanbei, supra note 2, 
at 406. 
 95. Campbell Davidson et al., Focus: SAIC Rules on Implementing the Anti-Monopoly Law 
(July 3, 2009), http://www.aar.com.au/pubs/asia/foasiajul09.htm. 
 96. Peter J. Wang et al., Structure and Responsibilities of Enforcement Agencies Under China 
Anti-Monopoly Law Clarified, JONES DAY COMMENTARIES, July 2008, http://www.jonesday.com/ 
pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S5372. 
 97. Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China Department of Foreign Investment 
Administration, Outline of MOFCOM’s internal structure [in Chinese], http://wzs.mofcom.gov.cn/ 
aarticle/gywm/200203/20020300003758.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2009). 
 98. See supra note 96. 












possibility for debilitating turf wars.
99
 Problems aside, some commentators 
believe that an independent anti-monopoly enforcement agency is 
unrealistic given the interests of the existing administrative players.
100
 
They hold that the ideal alternative is for the Anti-monopoly Commission 
to coordinate and delegate power among the existing agencies, and act as 
final arbiter of policy in the event of conflicting legal standards.
101
  
The second major enforcement problem concerns Article 51. One 
commentator states the problem well: 
First, any administrative restriction on competition usually reflects 
treatment in favor of the State-owned entity, and behind that 
favoritism there always exists significant economic benefit for local, 
government-owned businesses . . . . Second . . . . [I]t is not likely 
that [the so-called ―higher-level agency‖] would have an 
experienced understanding of competition law or policy.
102
  
Other commentators have said the enforcement provisions are ―so weak 
that the prohibitory language may be mere aspiration.‖
103
 On the bright 
side, the anti-monopoly authorities may have a role as surveillance, if not 




A third enforcement issue is the Chinese judiciary’s lack of experience 
in antitrust matters.
105
 Moreover, the Chinese legal culture may not fully 
appreciate the importance of competition.
106
 As one commentator put it, 
―China will need to engender a competition culture, so that when judges 
and officials balance competing interests such as national security and 






 99. See Xiaoye Wang, supra note 69, at 144–45. 
 100. See Mehra & Meng Yanbei, supra note 2, at 408.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Xiaoye Wang, supra note 69, at 149. This statement also adds to an understanding of the 
exceptions created in Article 51, and why they are so debilitating to the AML’s enforcement power. 
 103. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 60, at 177. 
 104.   
[T]he anti-monopoly authorities have the chance to play a strong surveillance role, perhaps to 
use advocacy powers to catalogue and publish the (surely) thousands of illegal market-
blocking restraints they may observe, to make proposals for remedies with teeth to the 
disciplining authority, and to tally up, publicly, the costs of the offenses to China. 
Id. 
 105. Pate, supra note 32, at 208; see also Mehra & Meng Yanbei, supra note 2, at 410.  
 106. Mehra & Meng Yanbei, supra note 2, at 410.  













III. EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW AND ITS POTENTIAL APPLICATION IN 
CHINA 
A. European and U.S. Competition Law Generally 
Because China’s economic, political, and legal situations are so 
different from either the U.S. or the European Union, the goals of China’s 
competition law differ accordingly. In the U.S., the core normative goals 
of competition law are benefits to the consumer and economic 
efficiency.
108
 In Europe, a much heavier emphasis is placed on unifying 
the disparate economies and polities of the continent, though economic 
efficiency has certainly played a leading role in the past few years.
109
 In 
China, the AML is part of an attempt to ensure national stability through 
continued economic growth,
110
 but the Chinese government’s focus in 
recent years on building a ―harmonious society‖ demonstrates that 
maintaining employment and political stability are also at the forefront of 
policymakers’ minds.
111
 Thus, where a U.S. court would disregard the job 
losses resulting from a merger if consumers benefitted with lower prices or 
if the merger created significant economic efficiencies, a Chinese court 
might prohibit the merger for the sake of social ―harmony.‖
112
 As a result, 
the U.S. body of antitrust law would not be an ideal model for China to 
follow, given its objectives in implementing the AML. 
There are also other reasons why it is not entirely sensible for China to 
follow the U.S. antitrust framework. First, the United States system would 
be difficult to adapt to fit the problem of China’s administrative 
monopolies. Doctrines such as ―Noerr-Pennington Immunity,‖
113
 and state 
 
 
 108. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979); see also 
id. at 22. 
 109. See ERIKA SZYSZCZAK, THE REGULATION OF THE STATE IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS IN THE 
EU 3–4 (2007). 
 110. See Pate, supra note 32, at 200.  
 111. Hu Jintao (China’s main leader, holding the positions of General Secretary of the Communist 
Party of China, President of the People’s Republic of China, and Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission of the People’s Republic of China) stressed the catch phrase ―harmonious society‖ upon 
coming to power earlier this decade. This goal has been interpreted as a departure from the previous 
strategy focused on rapid economic development and less stress on social issues. See SUJIAN GUO & 
BAGOGANG GUO EDS., CHINA IN SEARCH OF A HARMONIOUS SOCIETY 1–3 (2008). 
 112. See SUJIAN GUO & BAGOGANG GUO, supra note 111, at 1–3; Owen et al., supra note 10, at 
250; Pate, supra note 32, at 201. 
 113. ―[T]he principle that genuine efforts to persuade the government to adopt a particular course 
of action are not subject to antitrust scrutiny, no matter how anticompetitive the action sought.‖ Marina 
Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 966 
(2003). 














 serve to carve out exceptions whereby the state is generally 
allowed to engage in anticompetitive behavior.
115
 Second, the AML’s 
provisions against local protectionism
116
 are already far clearer and more 
direct than most legal interpretations of the Commerce Clause.
117
 
European Community competition law provides far more guidance for 
China. Unlike the United States, European Community competition law is 
more deeply rooted in problems of government influence on the market 
(―state aid‖ in the European competition law context), regional 
protectionism, and balanced geographic development,
118
 which are some 
of the problems Chapter V of the AML is intended to attack.
119
 Moreover, 
European law, unlike United States law with regard to U.S. states, allows 
fines against Member States for violations of competition law.
120
 As stated 
by a commentator, ―[the U.S. state action] doctrine establishes an 
immunity for the States regarding the antitrust laws, whereas the 
[European] Community case law has the opposite aim: to determine under 
what conditions the competition rules may be applied to public action.‖
121
 
China’s situation is therefore similar to Europe’s; just as Europe’s 
competition regime calls for a blanket prohibition on anticompetitive state 
interference in the market, so does the AML.
122
 Additionally, both provide 
exceptions to the blanket rule. In the U.S., on the other hand, the state is 
allowed to interfere anti-competitively in the market,
123
 subject to some 
exceptions such as for sham proceedings
124






 114. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (―The Sherman Act makes no mention of the 
state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by 
a state.‖). 
 115. See supra notes 113, 114. 
 116. See AML, supra note 1, arts. 33–35. 
 117. See Xiaoye Wang, supra note 69, at 149; see also Fox, supra note 60, at 190. 
 118. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, State Aids Under European Community Competition Law, 18 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 410, 414–16 (1994); Fox, supra note 60, at 186 (―[In the early 1950s,] Europe 
faced a dense web of nationalistic measures and privileged state-owned monopolies that isolated each 
state from the others. Europe needed proactive economic law.‖). 
 119. See Owen et al., supra note 10, at 255. 
 120. Fox, supra note 60, at 187. 
 121. JULIO BAQUERO CRUZ, BETWEEN COMPETITION AND FREE MOVEMENT: THE ECONOMIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 127–28 (2002). 
 122. See AML, supra note 1, ch. V. 
 123. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). 
 124. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511 (1972). 













B. European Union Competition Law History 
It is possible to view the modern European Union as a progression of 
treaties primarily concerned with ensuring free and fair competition.
126
 
Early European Community policy grew slowly, and much of the focus on 
state restraints was sector-specific.
127
 The unanticipated economic 
difficulties of the 1970s prompted many EC Member States to ignore the 
EC Law’s state aid restrictions
128
 (outlined below) and provide economic 
aid to specific industries.
129
 As a result, up through the 1980s enforcement 
was fairly lax in deference to the political sovereignty of other European 
Community Member States.
130
 In the 1980s, however, political 
sensibilities shifted in a pro-market direction, and the groundwork for a 
more economics-focused jurisprudence was established.
131
  
C. European Union Competition Law Prohibitions on State Restraints 
One commentator lays out four primary means by which the modern 
European Community prevents Member States from unfairly restricting 




First, the Treaty of Rome (EC Treaty), which established the European 
Community in 1957,
133
 is the initial means by which the European 
 
 
 126. The 1951 Treaty of Paris established the European Coal and Steel Community among the 
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg, moving the power over the coal and steel industries from sovereign states to 
international institutions. GOYDER, supra note 17, at 20. The April 1956 Spaak Report, spurred by the 
1955 Messina Conference, laid out the objective of a European Common Market: ―to create a vast 
zone of common economic policy, constituting a powerful unit of production permitting continuous 
expansion and increased stability and accelerated raising of the standard of living and the development 
of harmonious relations between its Member States.‖ Intergovernmental Committee on European 
Integration, The Brussels Report on the General Common Market (Apr. 21, 1956), translated in 
GOYDER, supra note 17, at 23 [hereinafter Spaak Report]. Following many of the Spaak Report’s 
recommendations, the six states of the European Coal and Steel Community signed the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome, creating the European Economic Community (EEC). See Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. The EEC 
became the European Community as a result of the 1991 Treaty on European Union. See GOYDER, 
supra note 17, at 21–30; STEPHEN WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE 
TO THE LEGAL WORKINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 2–4 (1993); see also Burgess, supra note 
4, at 1–3.  
 127. See Ehlermann, supra note 118, at 414–15. 
 128. See infra notes 131–51 and accompanying text. 
 129. GOYDER, supra note 17, at 372–73. 
 130. SZYSZCZAK, supra note 109, at 2. 
 131. Ehlerhmann, supra note 118, at 416–18; SZYSZCZAK, supra note 109, at 2. 
 132. Fox, supra note 60, at 185–87; see infra notes 133–47 and accompanying text. 
 133. See EC Treaty, supra note 126. 












Community prohibits protectionist state behavior. Articles 28 and 29 very 
simply prohibit all restrictions on trade between Member States.
134
 
Second, Article 86 of the EC Treaty places state-owned or controlled 
enterprises under the general European competition law except insofar as 
the enterprise is carrying out a public service.
135
 Third, Articles, 10, 31, 
81, 82, and 86 all work to prohibit Member States from ordering or 
authorizing state-owned or controlled enterprises as well as private firms 
to engage in anticompetitive behavior as outlined in the EC Treaty.
136
 
Article 10 charges Member States with fulfilling all EC Treaty 
obligations.
137
 Article 31 prohibits Member States from allowing state-run 
monopolies that are essentially commercial to discriminate against other 
Member States.
138
 Articles 81 and 82 prohibit a number of private 
anticompetitive behaviors that may affect commerce between Member 
States.
139
 Taken together, these provisions not only prevent local 
protectionism and abuse of government power, they alleviate the worst of 





 134.  
 Article 28: Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect 
shall be prohibited between Member States. 
 Article 29: Quantitative restrictions on exports, and all measures having equivalent 
effect, shall be prohibited between Member States.  
EC Treaty, supra note 126, arts. 28, 29. 
 135. EC Treaty Article 86 states: 
 1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant 
special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any 
measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for 
in Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89. 
 2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or 
having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained 
in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such 
rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to 
them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary 
to the interests of the Community. 
See EC Treaty, supra note 126, art. 86. 
 136. Fox, supra note 60, at 186–87 (2008); José Luis Buendia Sierra, Article 86—Exclusive Rights 
and Other Anti-Competitive State Measures, in THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION 596–97 (Jonathan Faull 
& Ali Nikpay eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
 137. See EC Treaty, supra note 126, art. 10. 
 138. See id. art. 31. 
 139. See id. arts. 81, 82. 
 140. Regulatory capture is a situation where regulators serve the interests of parties they are 
assigned to regulate at the expense of the goals of the regulations the regulators are assigned up 
implement. See Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of 













Last, the European Union’s ―State Aids‖ doctrine, outlined in Article 
87 of the EC Treaty,
141
 is a unique prohibition on subsidies and other aid 
from Member States to businesses.
142
 Case law provides four requisite 
elements to identify state aid.
143
 The first element is ―transfer of state 
resources,‖ meaning ―intervention by the state or through state 
resources.‖
144
 The second element is ―economic advantage,‖ meaning 
―[t]he measure must confer an advantage on the recipient.‖
145
 The third 
element is ―distortion of competition,‖ such that the measure ―distort[s] or 
threaten[s] to distort competition.‖
146
 The last element is the ―effect on 




Article 87 of the EC Treaty creates a number of block exemptions from 
the State aids prohibitions.
148
 Among these exemptions are aids of a social 
character to help individual consumers, aids to make good damage 
resulting from natural disasters or other exceptional occurrences, aids for 
economic development in underdeveloped or disadvantaged regions, and 
aid to assist the development of certain economic activities.
149
 As a 
general principle, the European Commission
150
 tries to weigh the anti-
competitive effects due to the State aid against the aid’s possible benefits 
to the goals of the European Community—such as development, research, 
employment, and the environment.
151
 
D. European Competition Law Enforcement 
Article 85 of the EC grants the power to enforce Articles 81 and 82 to 
the European Commission
152
 (the executive branch of the European 
Union), and under Article 88(1), the Commission must ―keep under 
 
 
 141. See EC Treaty, supra note 126, art. 87. 
 142. CONOR QUIGLEY & ANTHONY M. COLLINS, EC STATE AID LAW AND POLICY 3 (2003). 
 143. Hans W. Friedersizick et al., European State Aid Control: An Economic Framework, in 
HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 627 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008) (citing Judgment of the 
European Court of Justice of July 24, 2003, Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH v. 
Nahverkerhrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, 2003 E.C.R. I-7747, ¶ 75). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See EC Treaty, supra note 126, art. 87. 
 149. Friedersizick et al., supra note 143, at 627. 
 150. See infra note 152. 
 151. Maria Rehbinder, Recent Developments in Commission State Aid Policy and Practice, in THE 
LAW OF STATE AID IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 118–19 (Andrea Biondi et al. eds., 2004). 
 152. See EC Treaty, supra note 126, art. 85. Article 211 of the EC Treaty lays out the general 
responsibilities of the Commission. See id. art. 211. 












constant review‖ all existing aid.
153
 The Commission, through its 
Directorate General for Competition (formerly DG IV),
154
 has a duty to 
investigate suspected competition law infringement on its own, at the 
request of Member States, or at the request of individual complainants 
with a legitimate interest.
155
 Since 2004, Member States’ courts, 
competition authorities, and the Commission also have the power to 
enforce Articles 81 and 82.
156
 The result is a fairly open enforcement 
system, allowing administrative enforcement of competition law at various 
levels, and helping to ensure that problems are identified and dealt with.
157
  
IV. COMPARISON OF CHINA AND EUROPE AND EUROPEAN LESSONS FOR 
CHINA 
As with the United States, Europe’s competition regime is a product of 
its history and political goals and was shaped over a period of decades as 
goals and circumstances changed.
158
 So the initial lesson is that China’s 
competition regime must be tailored to the changing circumstances of 
China. That is, the competition law should emphasize unifying the 
national economy, drawing clear lines between public and private 
 
 
 153. See id. art. 88(1). 
 154. MARGARET GRAY ET AL., EU COMPETITION LAW: PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES 5 (2006). 
 155. Id. at 5–7. The Commission’s procedure for enforcing competition law includes eight stages 
as follows: 
 (1) the initiation of the procedure by a complaint made to the Commission or by the 
Commission on its own initiative; 
 (2) investigation by the Commission (also referred to as the fact-finding stage); 
 (3) the statement of objections by the Commission if the investigation has revealed 
infringements or incompatibilities with the rules of competition; 
 (4) the reply to the Commission’s statement of objections by the undertakings 
concerned; 
 (5) hearing, at election of the relevant undertaking; 
 (6) consultation with an Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant 
Positions; 
 (7) the adoption by the Commission of the final decision and its publication in the 
Official Journal; and 
 (8) where appropriate, the imposition by that decision of fines or periodic penalty 
payments. 
Id. at 4 (citations omitted). 
 156. Council Regulation No 1/2003 of December 16, 2002, on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, replaced Regulation 17/62. Sierra, supra 
note 136, at 88. ―In applying Articles 81 and 82 . . . national courts are bound by the fundamental 
principle of the primacy of European Community law and must follow the case law of the European 
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance.‖ GRAY, supra note 154, at 118.  
 157. See generally GOYDER, supra note 17, at 582–86. 













economic functions, establishing independent judicial enforcement, and 
clarifying statutory and regulatory authority. 
In a number of respects, Europe’s policy goals are closely aligned with 
China’s. Europe has traditionally placed a heavy emphasis on breaking 
down trade barriers to unite the continent’s economy and on eliminating 
unfair state intervention in the markets.
159
 Similarly, one of the major 
goals of the AML is to eliminate local protectionism and encourage trade 
throughout the nation.
160
 Europe’s shift towards privatization and pro-
market reforms through the 1980s and 90s also mirrors China’s shift over 
that period.
161
 On a procedural level, the similar judicial mindsets held by 
civil-law countries could prove an advantage should China wish to adopt 
European statutes and statutory interpretations. In addition, Europe has 
slowly and intermittently drifted towards a more central leadership 
structure,
162
 something that the current leadership in Beijing is eager to 
achieve.
163
 Also, mid-twentieth century Europe and modern China both 
have explicit policy goals of evening out disparate levels of regional 
development and a willingness to grant development aid to lagging 
regions.
164
 Last, China and Europe are somewhat wary of a laissez-faire 
market economy, and place emphasis on high employment and political 
stability.
165
 Because of these commonalities, the European approach to 
evaluating and removing anticompetitive state presence in the markets is 
worth further examination by the Chinese government. 
There are, of course, immense differences between Europe and China. 
The leading differences are the non-economic issues faced by mid-
twentieth century Europe and modern China. Europe’s gradual unification 
over the past decades was initiated not only by a desire to spur economic 
development through the creation of a common market, but to create a 
united front as a counterweight to the Soviet threat.
166
 China, on the other 
hand, faces no existential threats to its national integrity from outside 
powers. Rather, China’s leaders worry about social stability as the greatest 
 
 
 159. See SZYSZCZAK, supra note 109, at 3–9; see also Burgess, supra note 4, at 1–3.  
 160. See Pate, supra note 32, at 202–04. 
 161. See SZYSZCZAK, supra note 109, at 3; Richard Student, Note, China’s New Anti-monopoly 
Law: Addressing Foreign Competitors and Commentators, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 503, 505–07 (2008).  
 162. Burgess, supra note 4, at 1–3.  
 163. BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 28, at 77. 
 164. See Fagai Wei: Guojia Zhengzai Yanjiu Zhiding Xin de Xibu Da Kaifa Zhengce [NDRC: The 
Nation is Researching Instituting a New ―Develop the West‖ Policy], XINHUA NEWS, June 25, 2009, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-06/25/content_11601574.htm; see also supra note 143–49 
and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 166. D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 1 (1993).  












threat to their continued control.
167
 The ―new left,‖ in particular, fears that 
further economic development, such as it has been since 1978, may do 
more to undermine China’s stability than promote it.
168
 As far as 
government structure, it is significant that Europe’s supranational 
government is constitutionally far more limited in reach than China’s 
central government, which allows the Chinese government to more 
effectively and directly implement policy than could the European 
Community.
169
 Despite the differences in history and policy goals, 
Europe’s current antitrust regime, both in judicial analysis and 
enforcement, could serve as a foundation for further development of 
competition law in China.  
A. European Statutory and Judicial Lessons for China 
A major flaw in the AML is the lack of a clear distinction between 
SOEs that are essentially commercial and should be subject to the AML 
and other administrative organs which serve traditional public functions 
and should be exempt from it.
170
 The AML hints at this in its use of the 
term ―public interests,‖
171
 but this term is still susceptible to a tautological 
definition: an SOE might qualify as carrying out work in the public 
interest by virtue of its public ownership.
172
 The AML could either 
expressly include commercial SOEs as a category of ―business operators‖ 
over which the anti-monopoly authority exerts substantial control, or, 




The EC Treaty’s Articles 31 and 86 address this problem.
174
 First, 
Article 31 simply states that ―commercial‖ monopolies may not 
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monopolies are covered by the raft of articles tied together by Article 86. 
Article 86 indicates that ―undertakings‖ may be vested with public 
functions, but applies the EC Treaty’s rules on competition to the extent 
that the rules do not interfere with the public functions, and such functions 




The EC Treaty’s means of delineating between private and public 
functions could be used to strengthen the AML’s weak enforcement 
provisions in Article 51. At the very least, Article 51 should be revised to 
allow the AML to prevail over conflicting legislation if the conflicting 
legislation is directed at non-public function aspects of the legislation’s 
targeted enterprise or group of enterprises.
177
  
Application of the European Community’s State Aid doctrine to local 
and provincial authorities would also benefit Chinese competition and 
reduce regional protectionism. Application of the fourth element, ―the 
measure must be liable to affect trade between Member States‖
178
 could be 
altered by replacing ―Member State‖ with a smaller unit of government, 
such as the province or even county.  
Use of state-aid exemptions similar to those found in the EC Treaty’s 
Article 87 would also help China achieve the difficult balance of 
empowering the state to undertake targeted development and other 
economic policies versus allowing all and any state intervention in the 
economy. Such exemptions would allow the Chinese central government 
to put a general ban on government aid to the market, theoretically 
eliminating much of the more wasteful, inefficient, and corrupt spending, 
while preserving latitude for economic assistance where the Chinese 
central government finds appropriate. As above, in the Chinese context the 
balance of factors would likely be with regard to aid by local governments 
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B. European Enforcement Lessons for China 
Europe’s enforcement regime would be more difficult to transplant 
than aspects of the legal code and its interpretation because of China’s 
existing bureaucratic overlap and because of the power struggles that 
would ensue from a wholesale realignment of administrative 
responsibilities.
180
 Regardless, the current (nebulous) framework outlined 
by the AML suggests an enforcement mechanism reminiscent of the 
European Commission and its Director General of Competition.
181
 China’s 
Anti-monopoly Commission could serve a role similar to that of the 
European Commission, formulating general competition policy and 
delegating to its enforcement authority, which in China’s case would be 
the mysterious Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Agency.
182
 If, as it 
appears, the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Agency is not yet 
created,
183
 it would be easier to follow the European model and create an 
agency similar to the Director General of Competition, which would carry 
out tasks delegated by the Anti-monopoly Commission. If, on the other 
hand, the Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Agency is part of 
MOFCOM,
184
 it would be ideal for the other existing competition law 
enforcement powers in SAIC and NDRC to move to MOFCOM, as 
unrealistic as that might be.
185
  
C. European Policy Lessons for China 
The first major policy lesson from Europe’s experience is, despite the 
urge to correct all market inefficiencies in one fell swoop, such an 
approach may not be necessary or even advisable. Europe’s experience 
demonstrates that an initial emphasis on open borders and protectionism, 
with allowances for ―inefficient‖
186
 policies directed at social stability and 
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national cohesion, can still have a significant pro-competitive impact.
187
 
As is apparent even in light of the breakneck development of the Chinese 
economy, reform measures still require time for widespread acceptance 
among interested parties, particularly for the government to accept the loss 
of market power through control of SOEs.
188
  
Another major theme in the European experience may serve as a 
warning to China. Much of the accomplishments of European competition 
law are not wholly attributable to the wise jurisprudence of European 
jurists or the careful drafting of the continent’s legislators. Rather, the 
development of Europe’s laws regarding state restraints is due in large part 
to a policy shift in Europe throughout the 1980s and ’90s whereby huge 
portions of the European economy were privatized.
189
 Just as in China, 
however, privatization did not mean a complete withdrawal of state 
interests. Rather, a complex web of regulation and national interests now 
links the public and private sectors, and European competition law, the 
State Aid doctrine in particular, has evolved to address these new 
circumstances.
190
 In this regard, Europe’s most useful lesson may be that 
where there is sufficient political will to engage in marketization and 
privatization, a legal regime to balance the government and private 
interests may evolve and become workable.
191
 The mere passage and 
existence of the AML, let alone the sheer amount of academic 
commentary the law generated, are confidence-inspiring indications that 
there is a substantial contingent within the Chinese government dedicated 
to building competition law.
192
 
Whether there exists in China the political will to follow through with 
the promise of the AML to limit the role of government and allow for 





 187. SZYSZCZAK, supra note 109, at 3. 
 188. Xiaoye Wang, supra note 69, at 150. 
 189. See SZYSZCZAK, supra note 109, at 4. 
 190. Id. at 3–4. 
[T]he processes of privatization are complex. States use different methods and employ 
various legal and economic tools to transfer state enterprises to private sector ownership. In 
particular they are often reluctant to relinquish total control of the enterprise in question. This 
in turn has created a number of regulatory challenges . . . .  
Id. 
 191. See SZYSZCZAK, supra note 109, at 255–60.  
 192. Mehra and Yanbei suggest that the AML is a first step in a process whereby a ―competition 
culture‖ takes root in China, such that even if enforcement of the AML is weak, the ―competition 
culture‖ may have spillover effects beneficial to competition and state activity in the markets. Mehra 
& Meng Yanbei, supra note 2, at 383, 423. 
 193. BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 28, at 33–40. 












severely compromised provisions governing administrative monopoly
194
 
possibly indicates the strength of China’s ―new left‖ camp, as well as the 
unwillingness of those vested with regulatory control to give ground to 
other or new regulatory agencies. In spite of the setbacks, however, the 
AML still mustered support for passage with the inclusion of provisions 
prohibiting abuse of administrative monopolies. 
There are still factors that weigh against a wholesale adoption of the 
European approach to state restraints in competition law. The most 
obvious is that the European Union is composed of nations, whereas China 
is a single nation. The European Union’s deference to Member States, 
particularly the EC Treaty’s lack of applicability to regulations that do not 
affect commerce with other Member States,
195
 would be an unnecessary 
accommodation in China. For purposes of national control and central 
government superiority, China is unlikely to (statutorily) take such a 
hands-off approach to provincial matters.
196
  
Europe’s enforcement regime could be adopted in part, however. While 
unlikely today, it is not wholly unreasonable for China’s central 
government to force agencies such as MOFCOM, SAIC, and NDRC to 
reorganize and consolidate their competition-focused agencies into a 
separate, independent body.
197
 Less likely would be an adoption of 
Europe’s various avenues to enforcement, including direct enforcement by 
Member States (which would be most analogous to enforcement by 
provincial authorities in the Chinese context).
198
 China’s lack of a 
sophisticated court system
199
 means a specialized anti-monopoly court 
would be advisable.  
Europe had a number of advantages in creating its competition law and 
State Aid doctrine, such as the established place of the rule of law, 
political environments in Member States conducive to privatization,
200
 and 
a supranational central body (the EU Commission) without the same 
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vested interests held by the constituent states in continuing the state 
restraints.
201
 Regardless, China may implement regulations that will put 
real teeth in the AML in the next few years.
202
 The passage of the AML is 
a sign that China’s dithering on the fundamental role of competition in the 
Chinese economy is coming to a close, and the mere presence of Chapter 
V, dedicated to limiting state power in the economy,
203
 is a sign that, 
despite compromises, much of the leadership intends to put create firm 
distinctions between the private sector and public sector. The AML is far 
more likely to succeed in defeating local administrative monopolies’ 
protectionist measures than administrative monopolies that operate at 
national levels, such as trade associations or other administrative 
companies.
204
 National monopolies are more likely to have political clout, 
and some drafters have pointedly commented that the AML’s 





Despite its drawbacks, China’s new AML is a positive step, 
particularly because it addresses administrative monopolies, which are one 
of the more serious impediments to establishing an efficient and 
competitive market economy in China.
206
 Europe’s similar experiences 
regulating state intervention in competitive markets could be instructive 
for China’s future judicial interpretations and implementation of 
enforcement mechanisms. 
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